State governments are now the principal source of immigrant legislation in the US. Existing research presents contradictory findings concerning the sources of pro-and anti-immigration state legislation. However, research has not adequately accounted for the multidimensional nature of immigrant legislation and the fact that many variables hypothesized to affect state legislation encompass both within-state, time-varying effects and time-invariant, cross-sectional effects. Measurement and research design strategies to address these problems are applied to a dataset of state immigrant legislation approved between 2005 and 2012. The findings are important because they show that partisan, demographic, and economic effects are often different within versus across states and may differently affect the volume versus the relative tenor of legislative output.
Introduction
The paralysis of US immigration policy at the federal level now means that policymaking is centered at the state level, where legislatures have passed thousands of laws addressing immigrant-related issues over the past decade. Explaining disparate state responses to immigration has been the focus of a growing body of research, with some researchers focusing on the rise of anti-immigration state laws (Ybarra et al., 2016; Zingher, 2014; Marquez and Schraufnagel, 2013; Reich and Barth, 2012; Turner and Sharry, 2012; Schildkraut, 2001 ) and others emphasizing the relative mix of pro-and anti-immigrant state legislation (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishan, 2015; Rivera, 2014; Monogan, 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Boushey and Ludtke, 2011) .
Because the growth of state immigration legislation followed the expansion of immigration flows into states that had little past experience with immigration, a key issue within existing research has been the extent to which state activism reflects demographic pressures resulting from increases in immigration versus a politically-motivated shift towards either punitive or accommodating policies (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015) . Existing research has yielded contradictory findings. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan find restrictive legislation unrelated to state demographic change but rather a function of polarized partisan politics. By contrast, Monogan (2013) , Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) , and Boushey and Luedtke (2011) generally find partisanship unrelated to state legislation, with Boushey and Luedtke presenting evidence that larger immigrant populations induce more integrative state legislation. However, their results also suggest that larger foreign-born populations were significantly related to restrictive legislation and that the growth of immigration was positively related to both integration and control policies. Zingher (2014) finds that both legislative conservatism and the growth of immigration propelled restrictive legislation while Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) and Ybarra et al. (2016) present evidence of a more focused backlash against Hispanic immigrants. However, Marquez and Schraufnagel's results again suggest a contradiction, with the growth of state Hispanic populations also associated with increases in pro-immigrant legislation.
An unresolved problem in existing research is the failure to address two sources of causal heterogeneity. First, existing studies often fail to consider whether increased legislative activity necessarily alters the overall tenor of state legislative output. Because immigrant legislation spans multiple issue areas (education, health care, law enforcement, labor laws, professional licensing, welfare benefits), states produce varying mixes of accommodating and restrictive legislation. As a result, an increased volume of one type of law (restrictive or accommodating) may not necessarily change the relative tenor of state immigrant legislation. Thus, research designs should consider whether variable effects are presumed to affect the volume of immigrant legislation, the overall tenor of legislation, or both.
Second, researchers have generally ignored cross-state versus within-state causal effects at the state level. Individual predictors at the state level often simultaneously encompass short-term changes observed within a state over a given period of time-such as changes in the growth of immigrant populations or partisan control of government-and cross-sectional effects that are static over the course of most observational studies: the same variable also registers that some states are whiter, more Republican, or have larger immigrant populations than others. The problem is that in the presence of both causal effects, as Bell and Jones (2015) show, a single measure represents an uninterpretable, weighted average of these two effects. In situations where variables encompass both a time-varying, "within-unit" process as well as a timeinvariant, "between-unit" effect, Bell and Jones argue for a random effects estimation strategy that separately measures these two effects. This approach creates separate coefficients that distinguish time-variant and timeinvariant effects. "Within-unit" effects for each time-varying independent variable are calculated by subtracting the (in this case) state mean from the value of each observation:
where each i represents an observation-here, a legislative year-of variable x in state j and x j is the mean of that variable across all observed years in state j. "Between-unit" (i.e., cross-state) effects can then be estimated using the mean value of the same variable at the state level x j , in addition to any other exclusively time-invariant measures, z j . In this manner, average contextual differences across states can be distinguished from time-varying within-state effects. This "between" versus "within" hierarchical approach is presented below for a dataset of state immigration laws approved between 2005 and 2012. The models separately measure the absolute number of each type of law produced as well as the relative balance of accommodating versus restrictive legislation. At the same time, variable effects are measured so as to distinguish within-state changes over time from more time-invariant, cross-state differences.
Independent variables
Between-state variables. Many variables that have figured prominently in recent research differ across states, but not (over the course of existing observational studies) within states, including the following variables:
(1) Institutions of direct democracy (Turner and Sharry, 2012; Reich and Barth, 2012 Schildkraut 2001) . Differences in the presence and strength of direct democracy are captured here via Lewis's (2011) "Direct Democracy Impact" measure, normalized to range from 0 (No citizen initiatives) to 5 (Highly influential direct democracy). 1 (2) Legislative professionalism (Monogan, 2013 (Filindra, 2013; Hero and Preuhs, 2007 (Filindra and Pearson-Moskowitz, 2013; Ybarra et al., 2015) . 5 (3) Republican party control (Zingher, 2014 Table A1 in online appendix for additional information on the coding protocol and a summary of laws approved in each state). 8 Two types of laws are analyzed. Accommodating legislation sought to make public services, employment, state licenses, and housing more accessible to immigrant populations, regardless of their legal status. Restrictive legislation sought to bar access to the same goods and outcomes and/or enlisted state and local law enforcement in efforts to identify unauthorized immigrants. Following most recent work on state immigration legislation (Ybarra, 2015; Marquez and Schraufnagel, 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and NicholsonCrotty, 2011; Boushey and Ludtke, 2010) , unweighted counts of each type of law are used; the presumption is that counts of legislative output speak meaningfully to the importance of immigrant-related issues across legislatures as well as the policy intentions of legislators. 9 As is common with panel data, the counts of accommodating and restrictive state legislation are "overdispersed" (the variance is greater than the mean). Following Gelman and Hill (2007: 326) and Bell and Jones (2015: 147) , overdispersion is incorporated directly by including random effects at both the state and the observation level, yielding a three-level, Poisson regression:
In this model, the number of laws approved in legislative (Woolridge, 2002) failed to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. were actually associated with a 2% reduction in the annual count of accommodating legislation. Demographic and economic effects are also marked by different within-and between-state effects. Within states, restrictive laws increased by 52% for every percentage increase in the immigrant population. But states with larger immigrant populations passed more of both types of immigrant legislation: the average size of the immigrant population was associated with a 5-7% annual increase in both restrictive and accommodating legislation. Changes in state per capita income were also related to immigration legislation, consistent with Ybarra et al. (2016) . However, their study only examined punitive state laws. By contrast, Models 1 and 2 show that each percentage increase in per capita income (the "within-state" effect) is associated with, respectively, a 4% and 8% decrease in both accommodating and restrictive legislation, suggesting that immigrant legislation became less salient to legislators as state income grew. These distinctions were not possible in existing research, either because researchers collapsed state legislative output over multiple years (losing the time component) or did not distinguish within-versus between-state variable effects.
Findings: Revisiting state legislation
Other variables in Models 1 and 2 are more closely associated with one type law than the other. Citizen ideology, direct democracy, and the share of Latino legislators are strongly associated with counts of restrictive legislation, but less so with accommodating legislation. In Model 2, restrictive legislation increased by 21% for each unit increase in Lewis's six-point "Direct Democracy" Mean and standard deviation estimates based on a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations and 200,000 post burn-in samples. * The direction (+/-) of the posterior mean has a greater than 95% probability, based on posterior distribution. Table 2 uses a multinomial logistic model to compare three legislative outcomes. In some instances, legislatures approved more restrictive (R) laws than accommodating (A) laws. This outcome, R>A, constitutes the base category in Table 2 , and is contrasted to outcomes in which accommodating legislation predominated (A>R), and accommodating and restrictive laws were approved in equal numbers (A=R). 14 Relative risk ratios (RRR) estimate the effect of a one-unit change in each variable on the probability of the A>R and A=R outcomes relative to the base category, holding all other variables constant.
The results suggest that partisan effects were important to the relative balance of laws, consistent with Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) , but in nuanced ways. In states where Republican control of legislative and executive branches was more common, the odds of a relatively accommodating outcome (A>R) were 81% lower (RRR = 0.19) compared to the "restrictive dominant" (R>A) outcome, a directional effect with a greater than 99% posterior probability (PP). A similar, but weaker directional effect occurs between the "neutral" outcome (A=R) and the R>A base category (RRR = 0.45, PP = 82%). Thus, although Table 1 suggests that Republican control of state government was not strongly associated with the volume of either accommodating or restrictive legislation, Table 2 suggests that it moved the balance of legislative output in a restrictive direction. Likewise, within states, each percentage increase in Democratic legislative representation increased the odds of the accommodating outcome over the restrictive base outcome by 8% (PP = 99%) and by 5% for the A=R outcome (PP = 83%). However, legislatures that averaged higher Democratic representation across the period 2005 to 2012 were actually less likely to shift toward a relatively more accommodating stance. Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 suggest an interesting legislative dynamic: more Democratic-leaning states were actually less likely to adopt a more accommodating tone toward immigrants, except as the share of Democratic legislators within the state increased. Table 2 further clarifies the directional effects of economic and demographic variables. As the average size of the foreign-born population increased, states were more likely to be, on balance, accommodating (RRR = 1.06, PP = 92%) or neutral (RRR = 1.12, PP = .95%) rather than restrictive. Likewise, each percentage increase in average per capita income increased the odds of the more accommodating outcome (A>R) over the restrictive outcome by 59% (PP = 99%), and the neutral outcome by 90% (PP = 99%). Thus, larger average foreign-born populations raised legislative output while higher average per capita income reduced output (Table 1) ; however, both variables were positively associated with a shift toward less restrictive outcomes, consistent with Boushey and Luedtke (2011) and Filindra and PearsonMerkowitz (2013) . Table 2 also suggests hypotheses regarding the political processes producing each outcome. The odds of the A>R outcome compared to the R>A base outcome approximately doubled (RRR = 1.96, PP = 99%) for each unit increase in the Immigrant Welfare State and increased by 5% with average Latino legislative representation (PP = 99%). Each percentage increase in Latino representation within states further increased the relative probability of the accommodating outcome over the restrictive outcome by 18% (PP = 88%). Thus, growing Latino representation decreased the volume of restrictive legislation (Table 1) and tilted state legislation toward a relatively more accommodating balance (Table 2) . By contrast, more direct democracy decreased the odds of the accommodating and neutral outcomes by, respectively, 11% (PP = 87%) and 20% (PP = 92%) compared to the base outcome. In short, a restrictive outcome was less likely where states implemented more inclusive post-PRWORA welfare benefits for immigrants and where Latinos were a larger and growing share of state legislators. By contrast, stronger institutions of direct democracy reduced the odds of either the accommodating or neutral outcomes compared to the more restrictive outcome.
Naturally, the results here are time-bound, encompassing an eight-year period when the forces of immigration restriction were extremely influential in Republican state politics; and because there is no uniform standard for classifying state legislation, results may vary according to how researchers classify state legislation. However, the findings here suggest two guidelines that would provide more clarity and consistency to future research. First, given the multidimensional nature of immigrant legislation, causal arguments need to distinguish variable effects on the volume of legislation versus the relative balance of laws. Understanding whether states end up moving toward a relatively restrictive set of policies (e.g., Arizona), more accommodating policies (California), or some intermediate outcome depends on this distinction. Second, research would benefit from a clearer distinction of withinand between-state variable effects where variables encompass both processes. Substantively, many explanatory variables simultaneously measure the "pull of history"-relatively enduring contextual differences across statesas well as short-term economic, political, and demographic shifts. The forces may exert different directional effects on legislation, a fact that is obscured when research designs include no time component or when variables measure an uninterpretable average of both effects.
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Supplementary materials
The replication files are available at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/ dv/researchandpolitics. Mean and standard deviation estimates based on a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations and 200,000 post burn-in samples. * The direction (+/-) of the posterior mean has a greater than 95% probability, based on posterior distribution. Nebraska's non-partisan legislature is excluded from the analysis. 9. Raw counts also avoid the problem of determining "policy relevance," which involves ambiguous criteria, such as: (a) the share of immigrants likely to be affected; (b) effects on current immigrants versus future arrivals; (c) gaps between legislative intent and implementation/enforcement, and (d) symbolic versus substantive effects. 10. The variances are assumed to be normally-distributed in the multilevel Poisson model. Alternatively, a negative binomial distribution can be used to fit overdispersed count data by including an overdispersion factor. However, such models use a single parameter to calculate Level 1 and Level 2 overdispersion, leading Rabe-Hesketh and Skondral (2008: 394) to advise against them. Regardless, the distributional assumption does not appear critical here: coefficients and standard errors reported below were virtually identical when the model was estimated via a negative binomial distribution. 11. Because the data represent a population, rather than a sample, the goal is to assess the goodness of fit of the models rather than infer a population value, as in classical hypothesis testing (Gill, 2001) . Posterior means and standard deviations reported in Tables 1 and 2 are based on 200,000 simulations, following a "burn in" period of 10,000 iterations.
12. The significant time trend in Model 1 (b = 0.14, p < .001) and 2 (b = 0.10, p < .004) suggests unmeasured processes that are not easily captured. For example, state legislation may reflect the growing politicization of immigration nationwide during a period when Congress debated various immigration reform proposals or it may also reflect what Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015: 101) call "issue entrepreneur" effects. 13. The incidence rate ratio shows the change in the rate (count) of the dependent variable changes with each unit change in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant: an incidence rate ratio above 1.00 represents a percentage increase in the count, while numbers below 1.00 register a percentage decrease in the count. 14. For the purposes of this analysis, legislative years in which no immigrant legislation of any kind was approved are removed, yielding an N of 286. Distinguishing legislative outcomes according to the three categories, reduced the measured state-level variance in both Models 1 and 2 to zero. Thus, the multinomial logistic models in Table 2 are estimated as single-level models.
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Classifying State Immigration Laws
The data on immigration-related state legislation is derived from the National Council of State Legislature Immigration (NCSL) Immigration Policy Project. Since the intent is to assess both state legislative interest in immigration-related issues (i.e. the volume of legislation) and policy direction, we coded each law approved by the state legislature during the period 2005 through 2012, including those that may subsequently have been subject to partial (line item) or complete gubernatorial veto (approved laws with a subsequent gubernatorial veto constituted 3.5% of the total laws passed). In the case of omnibus bills that addressed more than one policy area related to immigration, each policy area addressed in the bill was included in the legislative count and coded separately for intent. This process yielded a total of 1,393 laws approved between 2005 and 2012. State laws were placed into one of three categories: accommodating laws or resolutions were defined as those intending to provide legal protection and/or access to public benefits and employment to immigrants, regardless of their legal status (unauthorized or authorized), as well as those encouraging federal reforms designed to extend citizenship to, and/or discourage the deportation of unauthorized immigrants; restrictive laws were those intending to block or limit access to housing, employment, and/or public services to immigrants, regardless of their legal status (authorized or unauthorized), as well as those encouraging the federal government to enhance border security and/or the identification and/or apprehension of unauthorized immigrants. Neutral laws were defined as those that had no discernible restrictive/punitive or accommodating/integrative intent.
To assess the reliability of the categories, two coders separately classified all laws and legislation approved in 2012. Their initial evaluations substantially overlapped (r = .77. p<.001). Discordant codings most often related to laws placed in the "Neutral" category. Based on the initial coding, some clarifications were made to the categories. First, laws that stipulated clarifications to previously approved legislation, but that did not change the intent of the original law were coded as Neutral. Second, human trafficking laws, whose intent could be construed as both accommodating or restrictive, were to be classified as "Neutral" unless: (a) they only contained punitive elements (e.g. punishments for human trafficking but no assistance for victims of human trafficking), in which case they were coded as Restrictive; or (b) they only focused on providing relief to victims of trafficking, in which case they were coded as Accommodating. Third, laws authorizing or releasing funds for programs previously approved were coded as "Neutral" provided no change was made to existing legislation.
Subsequent coding was done separately by each coder for each legislative year. In instances were coders had doubts about the proper classification of laws, these were noted and subsequent discussion among the research team followed, with the final decision made by the author. For purposes of the analysis here, "Neutral" were excluded (these comprised 244 of all laws over all states, or 17.4% of all laws approved between 2005 and 2012). Thus, the data analyzed in Table 1 was comprised of 1,149 laws that fell into the "Accommodating" and "Restrictive" categories. The three coding categories, and examples of laws placed into each category, are as follows:
Accommodating:
Examples:
-Laws protecting immigrants from fraud, theft, abusive labor/business practices (e.g. a "notary public" cannot present him/herself as a lawyer) or aiding immigrants who are victims of some crime. -Laws that ensure that legal immigrants are not denied rights or liberties. -Laws that state that immigrants and/or legal residents are allowed to practice a profession and/or acquire a state license. -Laws that create a state program that targets or assists immigrants.
Restrictive:
-Laws that enlist state/local officials in identifying or apprehending immigrants or create partnerships with federal immigration law enforcement authorities. -Laws that specifically exclude unauthorized or authorized immigrants from any state program.
-Laws that specifically exclude unauthorized or authorized immigrants from any profession or occupation. -Laws that mandate verification of immigration status for employment or access to state services.
-Laws that defund programs targeted toward immigrants.
Neutral:
-Initiation of a cost study or information-gathering with no predetermined policy objective (either restrictive or accommodating). -Allocation of money for an expense incurred as a result of immigration (either legal or illegal) or distributions of revenue accrued from immigrants. -Human trafficking laws that provided some combination of penalties for traffickers and assistance to victims of trafficking. -Provisions upholding existing legal requirements/ standards (e.g. providing emergency first-aid services regardless of immigration status, banning of discrimination based on race, ethnicity). -Laws stipulating legal or technical clarifications to previously passed legislation that leave the substance of that legislation unaltered. 
